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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS HOLl\fES, a minor by 
Howard Holmes as guardian ad lite1n, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
J. ENOS NELSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As the defendant has stated, this is an appeal from 
the order of the trial judge granting a new trial from 
a jury verdict of "no cause of action". 
It is believed that a restatement of the facts are 
necessary to simplify the issues before this court. To 
avoid confusion, the parties will be referred to as they 
are identified below. 
The accident occured sometime after 8:00 P.M. July 
11, 1955, and although the defendant stated he was driv-
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ing with lights, it was not dark. The State highway pa-
trolman who was called to the scene of the accident did 
not use his lights until he got to the scene of the accident 
(Tr. 37, 38). 
The accident was caused when the defendant, who 
was driving north on 800 West Street, Bountiful, Utah, 
ran his vehicle into the plaintiff, a three and one-half 
year old infant, with sufficient impact as to cause 
permanent brain damage (Tr. 153). The point of im-
pact was 4 feet 6 inches east of the mid-line of the street, 
or well into the defendant't lane of traffic, which was 
16 feet 8 inches wide Tr. 43, B on blackboard photo-
graph.) 
The following facts are undisputed by the defendant: 
1. That defendant was warned by his wife that 
there were children in or near the street when defendant 
"·as 300 feet south of the point of ilnpact (Tr. 203, 204). 
~. That the defendant saw children himself when 
he was 200 feet south of the point of impact (Tr. 9). 
3. That the defendant recognized and did antici-
pate that children would likely be present in the neigh-
borhood and that the~· did unpredictable things (Tr. 5, 
6, 7, 27). 
4-. r:rhat the defendant clain1s his vision was im-
paired h~· an oncmning vehicle (Tr. 8). 
5. 'l1hat notwithstanding defendant's knowledge 
of the presence of the children in and about the street, 
his knowledge that they were unpredictable, and his 
teu1poraril~· obscured vision, he relied on the assumption 
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that they would remain on the west side of the road 
and did not increase his vigilance, sound his horn, swerve 
to the side, or slow down ( Tr. 9, 10, 28, 29). 
6. That defendant claims he was 75 feet south of 
the point of impact when he first saw the plaintiff. That 
plaintiff was then leaving the sidewalk which was 33 
feet 9 inches west of the point of impact (Tr. 23, Black-
board photograph, 35, 105). 
7 .. That the defendant's own expert testified that 
defendant could have stopped his car at the maximu1n 
speed claimed by the defendant ten feet before the point 
of impact (Tr. 191). 
There was an abundance of evidence that the plain-
tiff was playing ball in his front yard prior to the 
accident and that after the passing of the vehicle which 
defendant claims blocked his vision (Tr. 53, 54), a girl 
on a bicycle crossed the street from a point just north 
of the impact and had reached her home some distance 
to the south prior to the accident (Tr. 64, 65, 66). Sub-
sequent to the girl's crossing the street, a small boy 
preceded the plaintiff across the street after a ball and 
was standing on the east side of the street when the 
accident occurred (Tr. 5, 6). 
Neither the defendant or his wife denied these 
facts. They merely said they never saw the boy or the 
girl on the bicycle at any time, and that they didn't see 
plaintiff until he was 75 feet south of the point of impact. 
The record also includes expert testimony that the 
defendant should have been able to stop his vehicle 
within 53 feet at 25 miles per hour, and within 43 feet 
at 20 miles per hour, taking into consideration the type 
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of pavement, coefficient of friction, weather, and other 
factors present (Tr. 113, 114). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST POIN-T OX APPEAL 
DOES NOT STATE A LEGAL REASON OR JUSTI-
:B-,ICATION FOR THE REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ORDER. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID XOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN ORDERING A NEW TRIAL. 
ARGU~IEXT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST POIXT OK APPEAL 
DOES XOT STATE A LEGAL REASOX OR JUSTI-
FIC.ATIOX FOR THE REVERS~~L OF THE TRlA_L 
COURT'S ORDER. 
The defendant clai1ns that there was evidence upon 
"·hich the jury could have reached the verdict of "no 
eau~e". Even if it be conceded that such evidence was 
available, whieh plaintiff does not. that fact would not 
<·on~titute ground for reversal. The rule in Utah was 
::-;tatP<l in Kiu,q r. Cuiuu Pacific R. Cu .. 117 Utah ±0. :21:2 
P. (2d) ()~)~. In that ea::-;e. the cause was tried twice. 
rrhe first tria] resulted, as here, in a jury yerdict for 
t IH' dPf<>ndaHt. The court granted a new trial which 
n·::-;nlted in a substantial verdict for the plaintiff. The 
< h· 1'<-JHlan t n ppealed, claiming mnong other things that 
t lwre was ample ~mbstantial evidence to warrant the 
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verdict in the first trial and that the court's order for a 
new trial was an usurption of the function of the jury. 
The court answered both contentions as follows at page 
696, 697: 
"On the contrary, in Cheffey v. Pennsylvania 
R. Co., 79 F. Supp. 252, 260, an action arising 
under the F.E.L.A., a federal district court 
granted a new trial in reliance upon Garrison v. 
U.S., 4 Cir., 62 F. 2d 41, where it was said: 
" 'Where there is substantial evidence in 
support of plaintiff's case, the judge may not 
direct a verdict against him, even though he n1ay 
not believe his evidence or may think that the 
weight of the evidence is on the other side; for, 
under the constitutional guarantee of trial by 
jury, it is for the jury to weigh the evidence and 
pass upon its credibility. He may, however, set 
aside a verdict supported by substantial evidence 
where in his opinion it is contrary to the clear 
weight of the evidence, or is based upon evidence 
which is false; for, even though the evidence be 
sufficient to preclude the direction of a verdict, 
it is still his duty to exercise his power over 
the proceedings before him to prevent a mis-
carriage of justice.' 
"The defendant urges that if a trial judge 
is allowed to set aside a verdict returned by a 
jury which is supported by substantial com-
petent evidence, there results an infringement 
upon its right to a trial by jury. There is no 
merit in this contention." 
In reviewing these problems, it must be remembered 
that the plaintiff was 3 and one-half years of age. The 
duty owed him was not that of ordinary care. As was 
said by the Supreme Court of Utah in Woodward v. 
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Spring Canyon Coal Co., 90 Utah 578, 63 P. (2d) 267, 
at page 271: 
"It is alleged in the complaint that the child 
who was killed was on the shoulder of the high-
way and that the highway where the grievances 
occurred was extensively used by pedestrians for 
travel. Such allegations, coupled with the con-
clusive proof that Charles Franklin and his two 
brothers were there just before the accident 
and that such fact was known to the defendant 
Brown, entitled plaintiff to an instruction as to 
the law applicable to the state of facts. Having 
alleged the facts upon which he relied for re-
covery, it is not necessary for plaintiff to allege 
the degree of care that the defendants were re-
quired to exercise. It is a matter of common 
knowledge that children are prone to be less 
mindful of danger than are persons of mature 
years. For that reason, a greater degree of care 
is required of a person who drives an automobile 
in close proximity to n1ature persons. Herald v. 
Smith, supra; Green Y. Higbee, 66 Utah, 539, 
~±-± P. 906; Blashfield's Cyc. of Automobile Law 
and Practice (Perm. Ed.) Yol. 2, § 1492, p. 519." 
The closest case in point that we have found is the 
l~J33 ea~e of Sclwcidcr r. Sheldon, Pa., 110 A. (2d) 226. 
The plaintiff \\·as a four-year old child that was seen 
son1e 500 feet a way b~· the defendant standing on the 
<'Urb of the street. Judgn1ent by nonsuit was entered 
in fayor of the defendant. The Supren1e Court of Penn-
~ylvania reversed, stating at page :.:!~8: 
''The fact that there is no evidence as to the 
ratl' of speed at which the defendant was driving 
his autonwbile does not operate to relieve hi1n of 
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responsibility for the accident. If he was aware 
of the child's presence on or near the highway 
long enough to bring his automobile to a stop in 
time to avoid striking the child and failed to do 
so, as the evidence in the present state of the 
record indicates was the case, then he would be 
guilty of negligence regardless of the speed at 
which he was driving: cf. Kuehne v. Brown, 257 
Pa. 37, 41, 101 A. 77." 
There is no doubt that :Mr. Nelson could have done 
much to avoid the accident. He had notice frmn 300 
feet away. He did nothing at that or any time to avert 
this tragedy. It is submitted that the plaintiff is en-
titled to a new trial by reason of the fact that the verdict 
was against the clear weight of the evidence and that 
the verdict was not supported either in theory or fact. 
On the contrary, the undisputed evidence from the 
defendant and his own witness warrant the conclusion 
that the defendant was negligent as a matter of law on 
three points: A. The defendant breached the duty im-
posed by law upon him if his vision was temporarily 
obscured; B. The defendant was going too fast for 
existing circumstances and failed to have his car under 
proper control; and C. The defendant failed to sound 
his horn or swerve his vehicle from the course upon 
which he was proceeding. 
A. 
THE DEFENDANT BREACHED THE DUTY 
Il\IPOSED BY LAW UPON HIM IF HIS VISION 
\VAS TEMPORARILY OBSCURED. 
Defendant testified that although he saw the child-
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ren playing at or near the street and that he recognized 
that children would do unpredictable things, he never-
theless assumed, because he saw the children retire 
to the side of the road, that they would remain there 
and that his way would accordingly be clear, notwith-
standing the fact that his vision of the children and 
that particular portion of the road where the children 
were was temporarily obscured. It is submitted that as 
a matter of law defendant's conduct was negligent and 
reprehensible. 
In the case of Holmgren vs. Fnion Pacific R. Co., 
114 Utah 262, 198 P. (2d) 459, the plaintiff was struck 
and killed in a car accident when one of the defendant's 
trains collided with the truck driven by the decedent. 
The plaintiff contended that visibility along the tracks 
wa~ obscured by telephone poles, steam pots, and other 
landmarks and was further impaired by steam arising 
from the steam pots and that as a result the decedent, 
could not see the approaching train and could not have 
been guilty of contributory negligence. 
The trial court entered a nonsuit against the plain-
tiff and in favor of the defendant and this court sus-
tained that conclusion that the decedent n1ust have been 
held to recognize that his vision would be ten1porarily 
obscured and as a result the decedent had an obligation 
to lH'Oel'l'd at such a speed as to pennit hiin to stop. 
The Supre1ne Court sustained the judg1nent of non-
~uit, holding in effect that one whose vision is te~upor­
ari I y oh~eurPd cannot assu1ne that his waY is clear but 
. . 
that the driYl'l' n1ust adjust his speed in anticipation of 
tlw fact that there may be danger ahead and so that once 
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his vision is clear, he can stop. The court said at page 
462: 
"If, as contended by plaintiff, the steam pots 
and other obstructions to vision so substantially 
limited Holmgren's view of the tracks as to leave 
it uncertain in his 1nind whether or not any trains 
were approaching, then he should have proceeded 
slowly and with caution to that point where he 
could get an unobstructed view of the tracks, and 
he should then and there have observed for ap-
proaching trains before attempting to cross the 
tracks. The conclusion is irresistable that Holm-
gren either failed to look, or having looked, failed 
to heed what he saw or should have seen. He 
must, therefore, be held to have been guilty of 
contributory negligence as a matter of fact. * 
'* • • " 
Certainly this motorist was in no better position 
than the motorist in the Holmgren case, and certainly 
the duty that he owed to himself and to the railroad 
company can not be as great as the duty which l\Ir. 
Nelson owed to this three and one-half year old plain-
tiff when he had knowledge that he was approaching a 
situation which he recognized to be fraught with un-
certainty. 
This same view was set forth in Seybold v. Union 
Pacific R. Co.7 Utah7 239 P. (2d) 174. There the plain-
tiff was struck by an unlighted caboose that was drift-
ing toward the crossing. There plaintiff claimed his 
vision was obscured by the engine lights of a train stand-
ing below the crossing. The trial court entered a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict for the defendant and 
the Supreme Court upheld it, stating that the nwtorist 
was guilty of negligence as a Inatter of law. 
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This is not law peculiar to railroad crossings. It 
affects motorists generally. Blashfield Vol. 1, Sec. 689.5 
states at page 586: 
"If a motorist cannot see clearly, he has no 
right to assume that his course is free of danger 
but must anticipate that some hazard to him-
self or others lies immediately beyond his range 
of vision." 
See also Langley v. Viguerie, La., 189 8. 606; Fabel 
v. Hazlett, Pa., 43 .A. (2d) 373; Halley, et al v. Josey, 
Ala., 82 S. (2d) 328. 
The problem due to 1Ir. Nelson's lack of vision might 
be likened to that of a driver whose vision is tempor-
arily obscured by the lights of an approaching 1notorist. 
In People v. Lett, 77 Cal., A. 917, 177 P. (2d) 47, the 
plaintiff was charged with manslaughter. He was con-
victed and appealed contending that the lights of an 
oncoming car blinded hun, that he kept on driving at 
approxi1nately the sa1ne speed but he "let up on the 
gas-the accelerator". (Exactly ~Ir. X elson's position 
hen>.) The conviction wa8 upheld by the court stating 
at page 48: 
"Since appellant adnlits that as he ap-
proached the crosswalk in which decedent was 
walking his eyes were blinded by the lights of 
another car, it beca1ne his duty to be vigilant and 
to antieipate the presence of a pedestrian in the 
erosswalk who could not be seen by reason of 
the bright lights. His inabilit~- to see objects in 
l'ront of hin1 enlarged his obligation to be cautious 
at the street intersection. He had no right to 
assun1e that the road was clear, and the fact that 
he did not know that decedent was in the cross-
10 
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walk is no excuse for his failure to give warning. 
Rush v. Lagomarsino, 196 Cal. 308, 317, 237 P. 
1066; :Meyers v. Bradford, 54 Cal. App. 157, 159, 
201 P. 471. His lack of knowledge of the presence 
of decedent in the crosswalk did not justify his 
not keeping a proper lookout for pedestrians. 
Reaugh v. Cudahy Packing Co., 189 Cal. 335, 340, 
208 P. 125; Zarzana v. Neve Drug Co., 180 Cal. 
32, 37, 179 P. 203, 15 A.L.R. 401; Schomer v. R. 
L. Craig Co., 137 Cal. App. 620, 624, 31 P. 2d 396." 
If the evidence was strong enough to support a 
felony conviction, can it be successfully denied that Mr. 
Nelson was not guilty of negligence as a matter of law 
in a civil case or that there was not substantial evidence 
to sustain the court's order. Indeed the instant case is 
stronger because :M:r. Nelson himself knew of the pres-
ence of children when he was 200 feet distant from the 
point of impact. 
Finally the court said at page 49: 
"It is sufficient to say that a reasonably 
prudent man would not drive at a speed of 25 
miles per hour into a place where pedestrians 
are expected to be and have a right to be when 
conditions are such that he is unable to see any 
object in front of him." 
Can we say more~ 
In Murray v. Pear·san Appliance Store, N cu., 54 
N. W. (2d) 250, the plaintiff was a minor who was in-
jured by a motorist who claimed his vision was tempor-
arily obscured. The court said at page 255: 
"In this respect we have said: 'On principle 
it would appear that the existence or presence of 
11 
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smoke, snow, fog, mist, blinding headlights or 
other similar 'elements which materially impair 
or wholly destroy visibility are not to be deemed 
intervening causes but rather as conditions which 
impose upon the drivers of automibles the duty 
to assure the safety of the public by the exercise 
of a degree of care commensurate with such 
surrounding circumstances. Anderson v. Byrd, 
133 Neb. 483, 275 N.W. 825; Fischer v. :Megan, 
138 Neb. 420, 293 N.W. 287.' Fairman v. Cook, 
142 Neb. 893, 8 N.W. 2d 315, 318. 
" ' * * * where the vision of the driver of an 
automobile is obscured, whether by the lights of 
an approaching car, fog, smoke or for any other 
reason, it is his duty to stop until visibility is 
restored, or to reduce his speed and have his 
car under such control that he can stop immedi-
ately if necessary. French v. Nelson, 111 Vt. 
386, 391, 17 A. 2d 323; Powers v. Lackey, 109 YL 
506, 507, 1 A. 2d 693; Paln1er v. ~Iarceille, 106 
Vt. 500, 508, 175 A. S1; Steele v. Fuller, 104 Vt. 
303, 311, 31:2, 158 A. 666.' Price v. State High-
way Com1nission, 62 \Yyo., 385, 167 P. :2d 309, 
313, quoting fr01n Taylor v. Quesnel, 113 Yt. 36, 
29 A. 2d 812." 
The court concluded that under these principles 
the truck driver wa~ undoubtedly guilty of negligence. 
In view of the age of the plaintiff and the conclusion 
that he is incapable of contributory negligence, it would 
~et>m that there can be no conclusion other than that 
this child should recover as a n1atter of law. 
See al8o: .Lllcsnickou· r. Fawcett. 99 Cal. A. 357, 278 
P. 500; 1Jc11son r. A11dcrsou. 1:2n Trash. 19, :2:23 P. 1063; 
hyclwll<'r u. Bjornstad, ct al., ~V. D. 40 X. Tr. ('!.d) 59; 
12 
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Coward'~'. Buckert, Pa., 113 A. (2d) 287; Lang v. Rogney, 
J.liinn., 201 F. (2d) 88; Earley v. Sutherby, Mich., 67 
N. W. (2d) 174; Miller v. Hine, et al., N.Y., 120 N.Y. 8. 
(2d) 231. 
It is inescapable that the defendant's claimed de-
fense is no defense but that on the contrary the defend-
ant is impalled upon his own spear by his admitted 
failure to take proper precautions after his vision was 
blocked, if blocked it was. 
B. 
THE DEFENDANT WAS GOING TOO FAST 
FOR EXISTING CIRCU1fSTANCES AND FAILED 
TO HAVE HIS CAR UNDER PROPER CONTROL. 
It has been established that 1Ir. Nelson did in fact 
breach his duty upon having his vision temporarily 
obstructed. The end result was that he was negligent 
as a matter of law. The corollary to this is that he 
was likewise negligent as a matter of law in being un-
able to stop his vehicle either because he was going too 
fast or because of his lack of a proper effort to cnntrol 
the car. 
A motorist who is blinded by bright lights and who 
continues to drive at the same or a slightly decelerated 
speed has transformed his automobile into a death deal-
ing juggernaut and if, while traveling in that elongated 
dark zone, he runs down someone who is unable to 
avoid him, he can't plead immunity from his responsi-
bility. Coward v. R1tckert, supra. 
Similarly under Wisconsin law a motorist has a 
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duty to drive his automobile at such a rate of speed 
that he can stop within the range of his vision and if 
blinded by lights of an oncoming car, to drive at such 
a speed as to enable him to stop within the range of his 
vision. Lang v. Rogney, supra. 
See also: Krauth, et al. v. Billar, et al., 71 Ariz., 298, 
226 P. (2d) 1012; Earley v. Sutherby, supra; King v. 
Farmers· Educational and Cooperative Oil Co., S.D., 33 
N.W. (2d) 333; Marsee v. Hunt's Adm'x., Ky., 55 S.Tr. 
(2d) 376; Fynn, et al., v. Kumamoto, et al., 22 Cal., A. 
607, 72 P. (2d) 248; Harrison v. Travelers Jiut. Casualty 
Co., etal, 156 Kans., 492, 134 P. (2d) 681. 
In Benson v. D. & R. G., 4 Ctah (2d) 38, 286 P. (2d) 
790, the plaintiff was driving west toward a crossing at 
a speed of 15-20 miles per hour. Plaintiff's witness saw 
the train of the defendant from a point 6:2 feet away 
from the locmnotive, although plaintiff said he couldn't 
see the train more than 25-30 feet away. The court 
held that in cases where the obstruction to vision ·was 
caused by the defendant, a different problen1 might 
arise, but in the absence of that, which was not the 
occasion here, the general rule applied, and stated at 
page 704: 
··r:rhis court is comn1itted to the rule an-
nouneed in Dalley v. l\fid-\Yestern Dairy Prod-
ucts Co. as follows: 
.. ·In this jurisdiction th2 doctrine is estab-
lished 'that it is negligence as a InattcJ.· of h:w 
for a person to drive an aut01nobile upon a 
t ravded public highway. used by ,~rhicles nnd 
pP<lPstrians, at such a rate of speed that said 
autonwbile cannot be stopped within the distance 
14 
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at which the operator of said car is able to see 
objects upon the highway in front of him.' 
"By his own testimony plaintiff was travel-
ing not less than 15 miles per hour and his visi-
bility was not greater than 30 feet. In the 
ordinary reaction time of 3j4 second (the time 
between recognition of danger and application 
of brakes) plaintiff would travel 16¥2 feet be-
fore brakes were applied, and would have re-
quired at least an additional 13 feet to have 
stopped on good dry pavement and not less than 
18 feet on wet roads after brakes were applied. 
Thus at the minimum speed estimated, it was 
impossible for plaintiff to have stopped his auto-
mobile short of 34.5 feet and well above the 
distance of visibility. That was negligent as a 
matter of law." 
The court held the plaintiff was negligent as a 
matter of law, stating at page 794: 
"Plaintiff's own testimony compels the con-
clusion that if he had looked he could have seen 
the train in time to escape, and he must be held 
contributorily negligent as a Inatter of law bar-
ring recovery." 
And further at page 794: 
"We believe that all reasonable men would 
agree that if plaintiff had looked he could have 
seen the approaching train in time to stop and 
avoid the collision, unless he was traveling too 
fast under the existing conditions to do so." 
Let us look then as to what is said. The court held 
that the view cited above is the rule in Utah and that 
the motorist must have his car under such control as to 
15 
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employed this most obvious and usual safety 
measure, he would have stopped 35 feet short 
of striking the boy. Defendant also testified that 
he was travelling about 25 miles per hour (tr. 77). 
Assuming that speed, he would travel 27.5 feet 
during the reaction time before the brakes were 
applied; after application, the brakes would have 
stopped the car in slightly less than 35 feet, 
making a total stopping distance of 62.5 feet 1, 
which would still leave his car 15.5 feet from 
impact with the boy. It seems unquestionable 
that at either the above speeds there was a fair, 
clear margin of safety by which defendant could 
have avoided the collision if he had applied his 
brakes when he first realized the danger. Further, 
if by any chance the brakes had not completely 
stopped him, he would have slowed down suf-
ficiently to have avoided the collision or at least 
so that the death or serious injury to the deceased 
would have been averted." 
How can defendant deny his negligence on the facts 
here at issue~ 
c. 
THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO SOUXD HIS 
HORN OR SWERVE HIS VEHICLE FRO:JI THE 
COURSE UPON WHICH HE \VAS PROCEEDING. 
The only case in Utah on the subject is Jl orby c. 
Rogers) supra. There the defendant blew his horn twice, 
once when he was 200 feet away and again when he was 
20 feet away. The court had already found the defend-
ant negligent as a 1natter of law but did note as follows 
at page 237: 
"Sounding his horn: The defendant's own 
testi1nony reveals that he was aware that the 
18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
deceased seemed to be oblivious to his approach. 
He did sound his horn at 200 feet but waited until 
within about 20 feet of the boy before sounding 
it again. Should we exclude the other safety 
factors above mentioned it seems that the jury 
could reasonably have found that a further warn-
ing by the horn between those two distances may 
have enabled deceased to learn of defendant's 
approach and avoid the collision." 
Thus it is certain that Utah recognizes the duty of 
a driver to use his horn under proper conditions. It 
has not had occasion to rule upon the duty to swerve. 
However, eighteen states have recognized this problem. 
In every jurisdiction the courts have held that when the 
driver knows of the presence of a child in or near the 
street or highway, the circumstances may require the 
driver to turn aside, 30 A.L.R. 2d 56. 
The newest case on the subject is Sullivan, Admr., 
v. United States, ________ Fed. Supp ________ , decided June 28, 
1957, cited, 12 Automobile Cases (2d) 91. The decedent, 
a three year old child, was killed by a truck of the de-
fendant. The driver noticed the child playing near the 
curb but he did not reduce speed, blow his horn, or 
swerve. rrhe court held that the defendant was negligent 
as a matter of law, stating: 
"Defendant was negligent. A higher degree 
of care than is ordinarily required is required of 
a driver who has reasonable ground to believe that 
a child may run into his path. In such a case it 
is the driver's duty to exercise such a reasonable 
degree of care as the circumstances require. The 
employee should have realized that decedent 
might step into the path of his truck. 
"A reasonably prudent man, acting under the 
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same circumstances, would have anticipated that 
a small child might step from the curb where 
she was playing onto the street. H·e would have 
done everything possible to avoid striking the 
child. Defendant's employee should have at-
tempted to bring his truck under control. He 
should have slowed down, sounded his horn, or 
anything possible to avoid the accident. The 
failure of defendant's employee to meet this 
standard was the proximate <:;ause of decedent's 
death. Decedent, being 3 years old, is conclusiv-
ely presumed to have been clear of contributory 
negligence." 
Can the defendant here, who acted identically to 
the driver of the vehicle 'in the Sullivan case, be held 
to be different By the defendent's own testimony he 
was n~gligent as a matter of law. 
' POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN ORDERING A NEW TRIAL 
A review of the evidence demostrates conclusively 
that the verdict of the jury was contrary to the law 
and the evidence. The facts and the law prove that to 
pennit such a verdict to stand would be contrary to all 
rules of fair play. Contrary to defendant's contention, 
the court would have abused its discretion and ignored 
its clear duty had it failed to act as it did. This duty 
that rested upon the trial court was well stated in 
King v. Union Pacific R. Co., supra, as follows at page 
696: 
"The law is well established that, on consider-
ation of a Inotion for a new trial on the ground 
of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
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verdict or decision, a trial court is not particularly 
concerned with the fact (if it so appear) that 
* * * the evidence (is) 'conflicting.' To the 
contrary, notwithstanding any such conflict, or 
even though the apparent weight of the evidence 
should be in support of the 'verdict or decision,' 
since it is the personal duty of the trial judge 
to weigh and to consider the evidence and to reach 
a just conclusion thereon, if he be satisfied that 
the verdict or decision in question is not in fact 
supported by the evidence, or that it is contrary 
to the weight of the evidence, he is not only 
authorized, but it is his bounden duty to grant 
the motion for new trial. 20 Cal. Jur. 117, 118, 
and authorities there cited. In such a situation, 
on appeal from the order, all that is required to 
sustain it is the fact that the record discloses 
substantial ·evidence in support of the conclusion 
that has been reached by the trial court in that 
respect." 
The rule was repeated in Marshall v. O.U.R. & D. 
Co., Utah, 221 P. (2d) 868, and reaffirmed in Bowden 
v. D. & R. G. Western R. Co., 3 Utah (2d) 444, 286 P. 
(2d) 240, as follows at page 241: 
"Ordinarily the trial court has a wide dis-
cretion in granting or denying motions for a new 
trial, with which this court is reluctant to inter-
fere, and will do so only if there is a clear abuse 
of discretion." 
The rule in the King case is still the rule in Utah. 
The defendant contends that such is not so and puts 
forth the Bowden case, supra, and Reynolds v. W. W. 
Clyde Co., 5 Utah (2d) 151, 298 P. (2d) 530, as his 
authority. An examination of these cases demonstrates 
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that the cases do not support the defendant's contention. 
The trial court granted a new trial in the Bowden case 
because of a believed error in law. The Supreme Court 
held that the trial court's instructions were in fact 
correct and that no error had been made. As a conse-
quence there was no reason for the trial court to have 
granted the new trial. 
Reynolds v. W. W. Cylde Co., supra, does not deal 
with the question of new trial or abuse of discretion 
In any way, shape or form. 
As a consequence, the contention of the defendant 
is without substance or authority. 
CONCLUSION 
The position of the trial court was amply supported 
by the law and the evidence. It did not abuse its dis-
cretion in granting the plaintiff a new trial. If there 
be any error at all it was in not granting the plaintiff 
a directed verdict against the defendant on the issue 
of negligence. 
Respectfully sub1nitted, 
PATTERSON AND KUNZ, 
.Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent 
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